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Paliotta v. State Dep’t of Corrections, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (Sept. 14, 2017)1 
 
CIVIL APPEAL: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined it must consider the sincere religious beliefs of the individual when 
evaluating claims under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). It is improper to evaluate those claims under the 
centrality test, which attempts to determine if the individual’s beliefs are central to a tenant of the 
religion in question. Once the sincere belief is shown, the courts must then fully examine the 
remaining considerations under the Free Exercise Clause and the RLUIPA. 
 
Background 
 
 Appellant, Gilbert Jay Paliotta, is incarcerated at the Ely State Prison. Paliotta filed the 
necessary form to declare himself a Thelemist with the Department of Corrections. Paliotta then 
contacted the chaplain at the prison to arrange a traditional Egyptian diet that would be in 
accordance with his religious beliefs. The prison chaplain suggested that he should instead request 
a kosher diet: the diet available in the prison most suited to his needs. Paliotta submitted his 
request. Later that month, Paliotta submitted an additional request stating that he had not yet heard 
back regarding his initial request. A month later, he submitted a third request to follow-up on the 
initial request. This additional request outlined why he requested a kosher diet, and stated that it 
should be provided in accordance with his faith. The prison eventually denied these requests. 
 Paliotta submitted an informal grievance again requesting a religious diet. The prison again 
denied his request. The prison maintained that under the Department of Corrections regulations, a 
kosher diet was not included as a religious consideration for the Thelemist religion. Paliotta filed 
two additional grievances and challenged the denial because the prison was already providing 
kosher meals to some inmates who were not Jewish. Those grievances were also denied. 
 Paliotta filed suit against the Nevada Department of Corrections and the Warden, Renee 
Barker. In this suit, Paliotta argues that the denial of the religious diet violated the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, and the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The 
district court granted the State’s motion stating that the requested diet was not central to the 
Thelemic faith. Paliotta appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims in general 
 
 In order to show a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause, the plaintiff must show that 
that the “proffered belief [is] sincerely held; and that claim [is] rooted in religious belief, not in 
purely secular philosophical concerns.”2 However, both the inherent nature of confinement and 
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institutional objectives limit the protections offered to an inmate under the Free Exercise Clause.3 
In comparison, in order to show a valid RLUIP claim, the plaintiff must show that they participate 
in a religious exercise, and that the State’s actions have substantially burdened that exercise.4 
 
Standard of review 
 
 District court orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo.5 The court must 
review all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there 
are any genuine issues of material fact.6 
 
The district court erred in concluding that Paliotta’s Free Exercise Clause claim failed as a 
matter of law 
 
 The district court determined that Paliotta was in fact sincere in his Thelemic beliefs, a 
point that the State did not dispute. The point at issue was whether the dietary request was related 
to those sincere religious beliefs. 
 
 Paliotta’s dietary request was related to his sincere Thelemic beliefs 
 
 The State argued that Paliotta was simply trying to use the court to receive better food. 
They also argued that Paliotta’s requests were insincere because he requested two completely 
different types of food on separate occasions. Paliotta contended that the requested diet was 
important to his faith, and that he only asked for a different modification due to the prison 
chaplain’s suggestions. 
 In Shakur, the courts determined that only the sincerity of the individual’s beliefs need to 
be considered when evaluating whether a claim falls under the Free Exercise Clause.7 Further, the 
court does not and should not consider whether that belief is a central tenant of the religion in 
question.8 
 Here, the district court determined that Paliotta’s request for a kosher diet should be denied 
because consuming a kosher diet was not central to the Thelema religion. Therefore, Paliotta’s 
Free Exercise claim failed. This was an error because the court evaluated the claim under the 
centrality test rather than the sincere belief test. 
 Paliotta established a prima facie showing that he believed the kosher diet was important 
to his faith. He showed a sincere belief that the diet was related to practicing his religion. Paliotta 
was therefore able to show that he was not only entitled to First Amendment protection, but also 
that his claims should have been evaluated under the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
The district court erred in concluding that Paliotta’s RLUIPA claim failed as a matter of law 
 
                                                     
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 1134. 
5  Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
6  Id. 
7  Shakur v. Shriro, 514 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2008). 
8  Id. 
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 The district court incorrectly utilized the Free Exercise Clause analysis with the RLUIPA 
analysis stating that both failed as a matter of law. However, the two have different standards for 
establishing a prima facia case. 
 Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff must establish that he wanted to “engage in (1) a religious 
exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is subject to a substantial 
burden imposed by the government.”9 The purpose behind this to include a broad protection of 
religious exercise.10 
 The State conceded that Paliotta was sincere in his Thelemic beliefs, but maintained that 
the kosher or Egyptian diet was unrelated to those beliefs and so, not a religious exercise. Paliotta 
argued that the diet was a necessary part of his religion, and that the State was imposing a 
substantial burden on his religious practice by withholding the diet. 
 
 Paliotta’s dietary requests constituted a “religious exercise” under RLUIPA 
 
 The State argued that the requested diet was not a “religious exercise”. Paliotta was 
insistent that the diet was a “religious exercise” under his Thelemic religion. The parties bitterly 
disputed what constitutes a “religious exercise”. 
 A “religious exercise” is “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central 
to, a system of religious belief.” 11 In Koger, the courts applied that standard to another Thelemic 
inmate who was requesting an alternate diet.12 That court determined that the modified diet was a 
“religious exercise rooted in sincerely held beliefs.”13 
Here, Paliotta established a prima facie showing that he believed that the kosher diet was 
important to his sincerely held Thelemic beliefs. Also, Paliotta showed that the diet was a religious 
exercise in the furtherance of those sincerely held beliefs. Paliotta’s religion was the cause of his 
desire for the diet. Paliotta was able to show text from a Thelemic holy book which addressed 
dietary restrictions as well as historical evidence linking his beliefs with Judaism. 
The broad nature of RLUIPA allows for individual interpretations of religions and 
individual practices of those religions. The district court was incorrect when it attempted to limit 
Paliotta's religious practice. 
 
 Paliotta’s religious exercise was substantially burdened by the State 
 
 The State maintained that the diet was directly related to a tenant of the Thelemic religion. 
Therefore, the State believed that the refusal to provide the meal was not a substantial burden on 
Paliotta’s ability to practice his religion. Paliotta argued that the State’s refusal to provide a kosher 
diet was a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion.  
 Under RLUIPA, the state may not “impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise” 
of an inmate.14 In Warsoldier, the court defines substantial burden as denying an individual a 
benefit which then forces that individual to act in a way that violates their beliefs.15 
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Paliotta was forced to eat a diet that was not in compliance with his religion in order to 
meet his basic living needs. Unfortunately, this decision to eat in order to survive also made him 
violate his religious beliefs. This forced modification of his behavior was a substantial burden on 
Paliotta. The State prevented Paliotta from fully engaging in his religion. It is irrelevant that there 
is a question as to whether or not that diet is a known tenant to the religion. It is only relevant that 
the State’s action forced Paliotta to violate his religious beliefs as he practices them. The State’s 
denial of the requested diet was a substantial burden upon Paliotta’s ability to practice his religion. 
 
Issues unresolved in the district court 
 
 The district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the State regarding 
Paliotta’s Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims. By doing so, the district court did not fully 
examine whether or not the denial of the kosher diet was related to legitimate penological 
interests.16 The district court also did not consider whether the denial of the diet was in support of 
a government interest and the least restrictive way of achieving that interest. Finally, the district 
could did not adequately consider Paliotta’s Equal Protection Claim. Upon remand, the district 
court must address these issues that it failed to do so previously. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court determined that Paliotta provided a prima facie showing that his religious beliefs 
were in fact sincere beliefs related to the religion that he was actively practicing. Therefore, 
Paliotta was entitled to the protections offered under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. 
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dismissed Paliotta’s case on a motion for summary 
judgment. The Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for proper review of 
the all of the claims. 
                                                     
16  Walker, 789 F.3d at 1138. 
